Following a recession, the aggregate labor market is slack-employment remains below normal and recruiting efforts of employers, as measured by vacancies, are low. A model of matching frictions explains the qualitative responses of the labor market to adverse shocks, but requires implausibly large shocks to account for the magnitude of observed fluctuations. The incorporation of wage-setting frictions vastly increases the sensitivity of the model to driving forces. I develop a new model of wage friction. The friction arises in an economic equilibrium and satisfies the condition that no worker-employer pair has an unexploited opportunity for mutual improvement. The wage friction neither interferes with the efficient formation of employment matches nor causes inefficient job loss. Thus it provides an answer to the fundamental criticism previously directed at sticky-wage models of fluctuations.
I. Introduction
Modern economies experience substantial fluctuations in aggregate output and employment. In recessions, employment falls and unemployment rises. In the years immediately after a recession, the labor market is slack-unemployment remains high and the vacancy rate and other measures of employer recruiting effort are abnormally low.
Unemployment is determined by the rate at which workers lose jobs and the rate at which the unemployed find jobs. I develop a model of fluctuations embodying both matching and wage frictions. The incorporation of a wage friction makes employment realistically sensitive to driving forces. My characterization of the wage friction is rather different from earlier ideas of wage rigidity and more closely integrated with the matching process. The model with both wage and matching frictions describes an economic equilibrium and overcomes the arbitrary disequilibrium character of earlier sticky-wage models.
A line of research starting with Diamond [1982] , Mortensen [1982] , and Pissarides Hence the DMP model cannot explain the magnitude of movements in recruiting activity.
In reality, the labor market slackens substantially in recessions and workers encounter difficulty in finding jobs, but the DMP model with Nash-bargain wage determination suggests stability in job-finding rates under plausible variations in the driving forces.
In a model with matching frictions, the bargaining set for wage determination is relatively wide, because the difficulty in locating matches creates match capital the moment a tentative match is made. The value of the match capital determines the gap between the minimum wage acceptable to the worker and the maximum wage acceptable to the employer. From the perspective of bilateral bargaining theory in general, any wage within the bargaining set could be an outcome of the bargain. The Nash bargain sets the wage at a weighted average of the limiting wages, with a fixed weight over time. The alternative I offer permits variations over time in the position of the wage within the bargaining set. When the wage is relatively high-closer to the employer's maximum-the employer anticipates less of the surplus from new matches and puts correspondingly less effort into recruiting workers. Jobs become hard to find, unemployment rises, and employment falls.
In the wage-friction model I develop, when changes in the economic environment shift the boundaries of the bargaining set, at first the wage remains close to constant. Then the wage adjusts over time because-thanks to heterogeneity in matches-the wage in some cases falls outside the bargaining set and is then moved to the boundary of the set.
This mechanism guarantees that wage rigidity never results in an allocation of labor that is inefficient from the joint perspective of worker and employer. Consequently, the model provides a full answer to Barro's [1977] condemnation of sticky-wage models for invoking an inefficiency that intelligent actors could easily avoid. Unlike frictions portrayed as essentially arbitrary restrictions on the ability to set wages or prices-such as in Calvo's [1983] well-known model for prices-the friction considered here arises within an economic equilibrium. It satisfies the criterion that no employer-worker pair foregoes bilateral opportunities for mutual improvement.
Although wage rigidity has no effect on the formation of a job match once worker and employer meet and no effect on the continuation of the match, rigidity does have a profound influence on the search process. If wages are toward the upper end of the bargaining set, the incentives that employers face to look for additional workers are low. I start the paper with evidence about the remarkably strong procyclical movements of helpwanted advertising and vacancies. This evidence supports the mechanism proposed here.
I then turn to the model. I adopt the matching friction of the DMP model. But as Shimer [2003] and Veracierto [2002] have stressed, the DMP model and others with the same basic view of the labor market do not offer a plausible explanation of observed fluctuations in unemployment. The magnitude of changes in driving forces needed to account for the rise in unemployment and decline in recruiting effort during slumps is much too large to fit the facts about the U.S. economy. For this reason-and following
Shimer's suggestion-I introduce the wage friction into the DMP setup. The resulting model makes recruiting effort, job-finding rates, and unemployment remarkably sensitive to changes in determinants. A small decline in the product price, productivity, or increase in input prices results in a slump in the labor market. With the wage friction, these changes depress employers' returns to recruiting substantially. The offsetting decline in the wage that occurs instantly in the DMP model is delayed by the wage friction. The immediate effect is a decline in recruiting efforts, a lower job-finding rate, and a slacker labor market with higher unemployment.
II. Variations in Recruiting Effort
The 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 The vacancy/unemployment ratio, x, serves as the indicator of labor-market conditions in the model. In a tight market with a high ratio of vacancies to unemployment, the unemployed find it easy to locate new jobs, so the job-finding rate ( ) x φ is high.
Employers find it difficult to locate new workers, so the job-filling rate ( )
is low. The matching model gives a precise meaning to the notion of tight and slack markets.
A standard specification for the matching technology is
The parameter ω controls the efficiency of matching and the parameter α splits the variation between changes in job-finding rates and changes in job-filling rates. The underlying matching function gives an elasticity of α to vacancies and 1 α − to unemployment.
B. Separations
For simplicity, I assume a fixed hazard, s, that a job will end. In the U.S. labor market, separations that result in unemployment appear to rise somewhat when unemployment rises, but separations involving direct re-employment in new jobs decline.
JOLTS measures the sum of the two flows; the sum rose moderately from December 2000 through the most recently reported data. The situation is further complicated by the flows into unemployment of people who were previously out of the labor force and the flows of unemployed people back out of the labor force (see Blanchard and Diamond [1990] ). My model in its present form does not claim to do justice to these aspects of labor-market dynamics.
It is straightforward to extend the model to make separations endogenous. The key properties considered here would not be altered by that extension. Because the U.S. has a well-defined Beveridge curve, nicely traced out by the data from JOLTS and the unemployment survey for the contraction that began in early 2001, separations cannot be too sensitive to driving forces, else the model would be unable to explain the high amplitude of variations in vacancies documented in Table 1 . Higher separations in slack markets would require higher vacancies to maintain stochastic equilibrium in the market and this influence could flatten the Beveridge curve unrealistically (see Shimer [2003] ).
In addition to ruling out endogenous movements of the separation rate, my assumption also rules out exogenous movements. That is, I do not take spontaneous fluctuations in the separation rate as a driving force in the model. A spontaneous burst of separations raises both unemployment and vacancies and shifts the Beveridge curve outward. The stability of the Beveridge curve argues against the importance of such a driving force (see Abraham and Katz [1986] ).
C. Equilibrium with Matching Friction
The following is derived fairly directly from Pissarides [2000] and Shimer [2003] . I use discrete time to facilitate computations. I let λ be the value a worker enjoys when searching (leisure value and unemployment compensation). The price of output is t p .
Other inputs needed to produce the unit of output cost c. And it costs k in recruiting costs to hold a vacancy open for one period. Workers and firms are risk-neutral and discount the future at rate β .
The model is conveniently specified in terms of Bellman value-transition equations.
Let t U be the value a worker associates with being unemployed and searching for a new job and let t E be the value the worker associates with being in a job, after receiving that period's wage payment, t w . Let t J be the value the employer associates with a filled job after making the wage payment. I assume, as is standard in this literature, that employers expand recruiting effort to the point of zero profit, so the value associated with an unfilled vacancy is zero.
The value transition equations are:
Conditional on the wage, t w , and future values of other variables, the first three equations determine the current values of , , and
, firms create vacancies up to the point where the payoff is canceled by the recruiting cost, k. As they create more vacancies, t x rises, recruiting success, ( ) t x ρ falls, and the point of zero net payoff is achieved. This pins down the key variable, t x , the vacancy/unemployment ratio.
D. Wage Determination
Here I depart from the DMP model, which views wage determination as the outcome of a Nash bargain. In this model, a worker with a reservation wage w U E λ = + − is matched with an employer with a reservation wage w J p c = + − . The symmetric Nash bargain would be the average of the two values. Instead, I characterize wage determination in terms of a Nash [1953] demand game or auction (see also Chatterjee and Samuelson [1983] and Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] w w w w w = = ∈ is a Nash equilibrium. Nash proposed the celebrated equilibrium selection rule-the Nash bargain-adopted in the DMP model.
I specify a different equilibrium selection rule to pin down the wage within the bargaining set. The basic idea is that the previous period's wage sets the norm for this period's wage. Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry [1996] discuss this type of a wage norm and Bewley [1999] provides evidence about the operation of a modern labor market under such a norm. Those authors focus on the avoidance of downward wage adjustments, but many of their ideas point toward the absence of immediate upward wage adjustments as well. My specification is limited in a way not previously considered in the literature on wage rigidity-I do not permit the norm to lie outside the bargaining set. The earlier work implied inefficient outcomes, especially the loss of a job under conditions where both worker and employer could have been better off with a wage adjustment. The wage norm I consider interferes neither with the formation of efficient matches once the parties are in touch with one another nor with the preservation of jobs with positive surplus. Inefficient separations cannot occur. As a result, the model provides a full answer to Barro's [1977] indictment of sticky wage models for invoking unexplained inefficiencies in economic arrangements.
In the simplest application of the idea, the wage would remain at its previous level as long as that level remained within the bargaining set. From a starting point where the wage is in the middle of the bargaining set, and for moderate disturbances that do not move the boundaries of the bargaining set past that wage, the wage simply remains fixed.
Strict fixity of the wage is not a reasonable property for a dynamic model. To Thomas and Worrall [1988] develop a similar wage-setting rule. In their model, a worker and a firm generate a potential surplus if the firm can insure the worker against wage fluctuations. But the worker and firm cannot commit to continue the relationship. Hence the wage is confined to the interval defined by the current bargaining set. The optimal rule is to change the wage only when it would otherwise fall outside the bargaining set, in order to shield the worker from wage fluctuations. The paper does not include a resolution of the initial indeterminacy of the wage-the subject of my work-nor does it include volatility of unemployment, which does not exist in the model. I assume that η is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ .
Let F be its cumulative distribution and f its density and note that
The average wage evolves according to ( is the symmetric Nash bargain wage rate. In a standard partial-adjustment model, the rate would be a constant. Here, adjustment is more rapid near the boundaries of the bargaining set than in the middle and more rapid if the boundaries are closer together.
E. Equilibrium
The model is a difference equation in reverse time. At realistic adjustment rates, this "shooting" problem can be solved easily by trial and error.
To find the resulting paths of unemployment, employment, and vacancies, I iterate forward from the given initial unemployment rate. Suppose that the labor force is normalized at one. Then the law of motion for employment is:
and unemployment is:
The vacancy rate is
(3.13)
IV. Parameters
To estimate the elasticity of the matching function, α , I use the aggregate data from JOLTS shown in Table 2 . I calculate x as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment and the job-filling rate as the job-finding rate divided by x and estimate the elasticity as the change in the log of the job-finding rate divided by the change in the log of the vacancy/unemployment ratio, x. The resulting estimate is 0.765. The model operates at a weekly frequency, to avoid the danger that either the jobfinding rate or the job-filling rate might exceed one. I calibrate to the data shown in Table   3 . 
V. Properties of the Model

A. The Stationary State
The model keeps wages essentially constant in the short run. Strict constancy of the wage would result in extreme sensitivity of the stationary-state unemployment and vacancies to changes in the product price, as shown in Figure 3 . The relations abstracts from transitory dynamics and from effects from changing driving forces. At a higher product price in relation to the fixed wage, employers put more resources into recruiting because they receive a higher fraction of the surplus.
Consequently, the job-finding rate is higher and the unemployment rate is lower.
The curves in Figure 3 The high sensitivity of labor-market conditions to the product price when the wage is fixed arises for the following reason: The gross value that an employer achieves from a success in recruiting is V J p c w = + − − (3.14)
Recruiting cost exhausts this value in equilibrium. The response of recruiting effort-and therefore of conditions in the labor market-depends on the change in V induced by a change in p. J p c + − is the present value of the profit margin earned by a worker in the course of the job and, with exogenous separation, does not depend on any other variables in the model. In the calibration, 1 104.92 dJ dp + =
.
With the wage held constant, there is no offset from a wage change and 104.92 dV dp = , resulting in large changes in recruiting effort.
The elasticity of V with respect to p is well over 50, as the level of V is 0.9. By contrast, with a symmetric Nash wage bargain, as in the DMP model, almost all of this increased profit goes into wages, because a higher p raises both w and w , so 0.99 dw dp = and 1.6 dV dp = . The price change has little effect on the employer's gross value and thus little effect on recruiting effort.
The sensitivity of recruiting effort to the product price depends on the distribution of rents between workers and employers. If every employer makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to its workers and captures all the rent, workers are indifferent between unemployment and employment and their wage is the present value of λ for the duration of the job.
Employers have large incentives to recruit workers at all times, but the elasticity of the gross value is unity and the response of recruiting effort to price changes is not very elastic. Thus the high amplification of price or productivity shocks that occurs in the model depends on the assumption that the typical workers shares a significant fraction of the joint surplus from the employment relationship.
B. Dynamic Response to Permanent Price Shock
I calculate the responses to a permanent price shock. The price jumps from 1 to 1+ ∆ in the first period and remains at the new level. I start the calculations at the stationary distribution of the labor force between employment and unemployment (94.4 percent and 5.6 percent). Figure 4 shows the response of the unemployment and jobfinding rates to a tiny price reduction of 0.1 percent. A standard deviation of the idiosyncratic element of wage setting of
reproduces the persistence of U.S.
unemployment, in the sense that unemployment declines to half its maximum level after 30 months. The thin line that tracks unemployment except at the outset is the stochastic equilibrium unemployment rate, t s s φ + -the unemployment rate that would prevail if the job-finding rate remained constant at its current value and the labor market reached stochastic equilibrium. The two curves differ materially only for the first few months.
Except for the period just after a shock, it is safe to interpret the labor market as in stochastic equilibrium. As soon as the price drops, the labor market slackens-the job-finding rate falls from its normal level just above 14 percent per week to about 12 percent per week. With a constant inflow to unemployment and a diminished outflow, unemployment builds rapidly to a maximum of about 6.7 percent. The wage moves downward from the start, so the jobfinding rate rises continuously. At about 7 months, improved job finding and higher unemployment combine to equate the outflow from unemployment to the exogenous inflow and unemployment reaches its maximum. From that point forward, further improvements in job finding bring the unemployment rate back down to its new stationary value slightly above the old stationary value of 5.6 percent (because the product price is permanently 0.1 percent lower). Notice that the overall dynamics of the model are second order and unemployment overshoots later in the adjustment process, though only slightly.
At the 10-year cutoff in the figure, unemployment is still a bit below the old stationary level of 5.6 percent.
C. The Adjustment Rate
When the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shift of the boundaries of the bargaining set is 0.23, the weekly adjustment rate ( ) 
D. Comparison to the Same Model with Nash Wage Bargain
A model in the DMP family can be created by replacing the wage determination process developed above with a symmetric Nash wage bargain, 2 t t t w w w + = (3.15) Figure 5 shows the relations between the product price, p, and the job finding, and unemployment rates in the stationary state. Figure 5 displays the property of the DMP model stressed by Shimer [2003] and Veracierto [2002] -large movements in the driving forces are needed to explain observed movements in unemployment. In their models, the driving force is productivity. The variable p in this model could be interpreted as productivity instead of the product price. In addition, responses to changes in input prices would be essentially the same as for product prices. A change of several percent in p is required to change unemployment by one percentage point. Observed movements in productivity or in price-cost margins are typically nowhere near that large. Figure 6 shows the dynamic responses to a permanent downward price shock of 4 percent. Unemployment rises rapidly to its new permanently higher level. The job-finding rate drops immediately to its new permanent level. The vacancy rate (not shown) moves in the same way as the job-finding rate. Except for the transitory dynamics from matching, the DMP model lacks the dynamics of the wage-friction model-conditions in the labor market, as measured by the job-finding rate, the job-filling rate, or the vacancy rate, move immediately to their new stationary levels. In order to generate realistic impulse responses, resembling those in Figure 4 for the wage-friction model, the DMP model must invoke persistent but non-permanent movements of the driving force. 
VI.
More Elaborate Wage Norms Friedman [1968] and Phelps [1967] launched a rich literature on inertia in wage and price determination. They pointed out that the wage determination process would probably adapt to persistent inflation and thereby offset the tightening of the labor market that a simple model of inertia would predict. Experience in many countries in the ensuing three decades generally confirmed this proposition. The wage-adjustment process summarized in equation (3.9) could be augmented with a term that raised the wage norm by enough each period to incorporate adaptation to persistent inflation. This is also an appropriate point to note that the wage-adjustment process is sensitive to the units in which wages are set. Equation (3.9) implies quite different outcomes if the wage is measured in money terms rather than in real terms. Both interpretations are consistent with the underlying idea that wage determination is an equilibrium selection issue within the bargaining set implied by the matching model. The wage norm also may help understand episodes in wage determination that do not fit the expectation view at all. Episodes of discrete, sudden regime change-such as those documented by Sargent [1982] -seem to break the connection of wage and price determination to history. These episodes do not fit econometric models based on expectation formation. The notion of a wage norm is sufficiently flexible to include rapid change in times of clear breaks in policy.
The wage-friction model developed in this paper, based on a wage norm as an equilibrium selection mechanism, achieves a strict standard of predictive power in one respect-that the wage never falls outside the bargaining set-but is permissive with respect to wage-determination mechanisms that keep the wage inside the bargaining set.
Application of the model in practice needs to be guided by evidence about actual wage determination, because theory is unrestrictive apart from the role of the bargaining set.
VII. Concluding Remarks
Strong evidence supports the following view of fluctuations in employment and unemployment: When the labor market is tight and unemployment is low, employers devote substantial resources to recruiting workers. Job-finding rates for the unemployed are high. By contrast, when the market is slack and unemployment is high, employers recruit less aggressively and job-finding rates are low. Data on help-wanted advertising, vacancies, and unemployment confirm these relations. Further, transitions from strong markets with low unemployment and high vacancies to weak markets with high unemployment and low vacancies seem to occur without large measurable changes in driving forces. Rather, small shocks stimulate large responses of unemployment.
I have offered a model of fluctuations in the labor market that mimics all of these properties. In the model, the labor market becomes slack when recent events have lowered the benefit to the employer from hiring. These events, such as a small decline in productivity or a small rise in input prices, substantially reduce the payoff to hiring during the time when wage friction inhibits the offsetting movement of the wage. The friction is plausible, because it occurs only within the range where the wage does not block efficient bargains from being struck and maintained. The outcome of the bargain between worker and employer is fundamentally indeterminate and the wage friction is an equilibrium selection mechanism. The friction can be interpreted in terms of a wage norm that provides the equilibrium selection function.
